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ABUSING PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 
 
JD  v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others 
[2005] UKHL 23; [2005] 2 WLR 993; [2005] 2 All ER 443 
House of Lords 
21 April 2005 
Negligence - Human rights - Child abuse - No duty to wrongly suspected parent 
 
Introduction 
Three conjoined appeals were brought before the House by parents falsely suspected 
by child welfare professionals (principally doctors) of abusing their children. The 
parents claimed to have suffered psychiatric or other harm in consequence. In each 
case an action for damages for common law negligence was dismissed by a judge on 
the preliminary ground that no duty of care could arise in such circumstances. The 
Court of Appeal affirmed the judges' rulings. The House of Lords dismissed these 
further appeals holding that it was not 'fair, just and reasonable' to impose a duty of 
care (per Lords Nicholls, Steyn, Rodger, and Brown: Lord Bingham dissenting). 
Decision of the Court of Appeal [2003] EWCA Civ 1151; [2004] QB 558 affirmed. 
 
Facts 
In the first appeal, JD, the mother of a five-year old boy with what turned out to be 
severe multiple allergies, was wrongly suspected of fabricating his condition and of 
harming him herself. She was misdiagnosed as suffering from Munchhausen's 
Syndrome by Proxy, an error that took almost three years to rectify. In the second, 
RK, a nine-year old girl with patches of discoloured skin in the genital region caused 
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by the rare Schamberg's Disease was initially believed have been sexually abused. 
Her father was prevented from seeing her for the twelve days it took hospital staff to 
correctly diagnose her condition. In the third case, MK's parents were separated from 
her for some eight months after a consultant wrongly diagnosed a femoral fracture as 
an 'inflicted injury'. The child was put into the care of an aunt where she sustained 
further fractures: only then was the cause of her injuries reviewed and correctly 
identified as osteogenesis imperfecta or brittle bone disease. In each case, the 
respondent authorities conceded that the parents were now free of all suspicion and 
guilt but denied that there had been any want of care in fact or in law. 
  
Commentary 
Across the post-war period a series of high profile inquiries has documented the dire 
consequences of child welfare agencies failing to deal promptly and effectively with 
suspected instances of abuse and neglect (see, for example, Victoria Climbié Inquiry, 
Cm 5730, 2003). In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633 abused children 
badly let down by the authorities were told they had no remedy (except against their 
abusers) because child protection decisions are too delicate and complex to be 
justiciable  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Z v UK [2001] 2 FLR 
612 disagreed. Whilst recognising the frequently difficult nature of the task, the 
ECtHR nonetheless considered that the protracted failure to safeguard the 
'Bedfordshire' children, who were known to be at risk of parental abuse, violated their 
Article 3 right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 
Influenced by such human rights considerations, it began to appear as if domestic 
courts would adopt a more nuanced (perhaps more sceptical) approach to policy-based 
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'no duty' arguments or, at least, that striking out claims in developing areas of law was 
coming to be regarded as undesirable. However, the East Berkshire decision reasserts 
the central importance of duty as a control device (at least in this context) while 
declining a further opportunity to better align common law negligence and human 
rights law. Doctors and social workers owe no duty to parents who suffer foreseeable 
psychiatric or other harm caused by the careless manner in which suspected abuse is 
investigated. Their only duty is to act in good faith.  English law’s continuing failure 
to respect the right of parents to family life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention means that this insular decision is vulnerable to vicarious challenge in 
Strasbourg. Whether each individual claim will ultimately succeed on the facts is 
rather less certain. As well as demonstrating a sufficient causal connection to the 
alleged loss, it would need to be shown that a public authority had unfairly 
disregarded the interests of the parent in question, lacked any proper basis for 
suspecting them, acted wholly prematurely or otherwise failed properly to pursue a 
legitimate objective. 
  
The new duty to children 
There was no appeal against the Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision to allow the 
claim by RK (the child in the second appeal) going to trial (see Kevin Williams, 
'Revising liability for child abuse in Britain' (2004) Tort L Rev 63). Ironically, that 
decision was based on the bold proposition that the earlier 'no duty to children' rule 
deriving from X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC had not 'survived' the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (see [2003] EWCA Civ 1151 at [83]). While some 
commentators doubted the propriety of the Court of Appeal departing from precedent 
in this way (see Jane Wright, 'Immunity no more: Child abuse cases and public 
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authority liability in negligence' (2004) 20 PN 58), in the House it seems to have been 
accepted obiter (and without much discussion) that children suspected of being the 
victims of abuse are owed a duty (see Lord Nicholls at [82], Lord Brown at [124] and 
Lord Bingham at [30]). In effect, the authorities may be (vicariously) liable for failing 
to rescue children they know or ought to know are at risk.  
 
No duty to wrongly suspected (parental) abusers 
Before the House it was agreed on all sides that identifying and protecting children 
from abuse should have the highest priority. Like the Court of Appeal, a majority of 
their Lordships concluded that the only safe way of ensuring this was to adopt a 'no 
duty to parents' analysis. Where abuse is suspected, parents' interests in contesting 
allegations, maintaining custody and resisting what they believe to be unwarranted 
interferences must inevitably conflict with that primary objective. Necessary enquiries 
and decisions might be compromised if their likely impact on parents had also to be 
considered, particularly in those not uncommon cases where the immediately 
available evidence of abuse is inconclusive. For the majority, this policy consideration 
meant that it would not be 'fair, just and reasonable' to impose simultaneous duties of 
care in favour of both children and suspected parents. Moreover, if parents' interests 
were entitled to careful consideration why not the position of less proximate parties? 
Anticipating this difficulty, counsel for the appellants had urged that the duty should 
be confined to a child's 'primary carers'. The majority was not persuaded that this 
would be a workable limitation, in which event every suspect (whether a stranger, 
babysitter or teacher) would also be entitled to protection, so further threatening 
children's interests (see Lord Nicholls at [85-91], Lord Brown at [128-133], and Lord 
Rodger at [110-117]). Additionally, Lord Nicholls pointed out that persons suspected 
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of crime could generally expect no more of police and prosecuting authorities than 
that they act in good faith (at [77]). The fact that the appellants happened to be parents 
who 'took the unexceptional step' of bringing their child's condition to the attention of 
doctors should make no difference (at [91]). The possibility that their family life 
might be wrongfully interfered with did not give them any greater protection nor put 
them in a special category separate from other suspected abusers. 
  
Tied in with the 'conflicting duties' argument was the majority's belief that a liability 
rule might encourage 'defensive' practices and thus sub-optimal child protection 
decisions. Witness statements from a distinguished paediatrician and the NSPCC had 
testified to the difficulties of diagnosis and the undesirability of electing in the face of 
evidential uncertainty for the 'easy option' of doing nothing. In light of this, Lord 
Brown advanced two 'fundamental considerations' telling against wrongly suspected 
parents being allowed the option of arguing breach of duty (at [137]). First, the 
'insidious effect' duty would have 'on the mind and conduct of the doctor (subtly 
tending to the suppression of doubts and instincts which in the child's interests ought 
rather to be encouraged)'. Secondly, the need to protect doctors from the 'very real 
risk' that disgruntled parents would bring 'costly and vexing litigation' in order to 
vindicate their reputation. While Lord Nicholls doubted that professionals would be 
'consciously swayed' (being made of 'sterner stuff'), he nevertheless concluded that 
their decisions 'should not be clouded by imposing a conflicting duty in favour of 
parents or others suspected of abuse' (at [86]).  
 
The Privy Council had come to similar conclusions in B v Attorney General of New 
Zealand [2003] UKPC 61; [2003] 4 All ER 833 where it was said that ‘the interests of 
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the alleged perpetrator and of the children as alleged victims are poles apart’ (at [30]). 
It would not be ‘satisfactory’ if welfare professionals and their employers were to find 
themselves facing both ways, as it were. The decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 is to much the same effect (albeit that it 
rejected the Caparo test for duty). An impressive array of authority, but are the 
reasons and the result sound? Seemingly, a wrongly suspected parent has no common 
law remedy, however egregious the error or Draconian the consequence. According to 
Lord Brown, this is the price the common law extracts from individual parents 'in the 
interests of children generally' (at [138]).  
 
The dissent in favour of duty 
Lord Bingham delivered a strong dissenting speech. Barrett v Enfield LBC [2001] 2 
AC 550 and Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619 having written down fears of 
excessive caution by local authorities when exercising statutory powers, his Lordship  
found it hard to see how a duty towards parents 'could encourage healthcare 
professionals either to overlook signs of abuse which they should recognise or draw 
inferences of abuse which the evidence did not justify'. And to assert, as Lord Brown 
had, that awareness of legal duty would have an 'insidious effect' on their conduct was 
'to undermine the foundation of the law of professional negligence' (at [33]). Nor was 
he persuaded that the appellants were contending for two irreconcilably conflicting 
duties: the duty was essentially the same, namely, to pay careful regard when making 
a diagnosis of child abuse, a duty already owed to the child (at [37]). The interest 
abusive parents have in concealment was not an interest that the law would recognise 
as legitimate. 
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Rather than striking out, Lord Bingham's preferred solution was to leave matters to be 
resolved at trial via the mechanism of breach, bearing in mind that defendants are not 
required to be right but only careful (at [32]) and that claimants should be expected to 
show 'a very clear departure from ordinary standards of skill and care' (at [49]). His 
Lordship added that parental claims would not be summarily dismissed in France or 
Germany and that in neither country have the courts been 'flooded with claims' (at 
[49]). Of course, abandoning the ‘bright line’ exclusionary rule may well result in 
evidentially difficult and costly trials and claimant-friendly settlements which drain 
limited budgets. Moreover, the earlier successes of (English) parents in Strasbourg 
have not continued to pass unnoticed by lawyers in Germany and elsewhere.  
 
For his part, Lord Nicholls could see that leaving breach to act as the gatekeeper had 
attractions. It was more 'flexible' and 'analogous' to the approach adopted when 
considering violations of human rights, yet to ‘jettison’ the duty concept would lead to 
'a protracted period of uncertainty'. This was undesirable as well as unnecessary since 
nowadays claims can be brought directly against public authorities for breaches of the 
European Convention (at [92-94]).  
 
Absence of duty and human rights 
Contrary to the hopes of the majority, providing doctors and social workers with a 
tortious immunity from parental claims is unlikely to reassure them or to influence 
their professional conduct. They are already exposed to the risk of being sued - by 
children for negligence or under the Human Rights Act (see East Berkshire in the 
Court of Appeal and Z v UK), and by parents claiming infringement of their Article 8 
right to family life. In M (A Minor) v Newham LBC [1995] AC 633, the mother’s 
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cohabitee was suspected of sexually abusing her daughter, wrongly as it transpired 
later. The House of Lords' denial that a duty of care arose was effectively overturned 
by the ECtHR in TP and KM v UK [2001] 2 FLR 549. The Strasbourg court refused 
to say that the original decision to seek a place of safety order had been wrong. There 
were good reasons to suspect that the child had been abused, as well as doubts about 
the ability of the mother to protect the daughter, so that her removal had been ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and done in pursuit of a ‘legitimate aim’, as Article 8(2) 
requires. The authorities were properly entitled to a wide margin of appreciation when 
deciding whether a child needs protecting. In the language of negligence, there had 
been no breach, initially. However, as regards later decisions restricting a parent’s 
right of access, the ECtHR considered that ‘stricter scrutiny’ was justified. The 
subsequent serious delays and other shortcomings had deprived the mother of the 
opportunity to challenge the conclusion that it was unsafe to return her daughter, 
which prevented the process being regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
Having unfairly infringed both mother and daughter’s Article 8 rights, they were 
entitled to an effective remedy. While this is not the same as saying that social 
services or doctors owe parents a duty of care, the areas of factual enquiry and the 
effect are much the same. Requiring parents to be ‘involved in the decision-making 
process to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their 
interests’ (at [72]) reads a procedural requirement into Article 8. This ought not to be 
problematic for child protection agencies since, even at the earliest stage when 
consideration is being given to the question whether the child is at risk, good practice 
and ministerial guidance means that it is expected (as well as usual) for parental views 
to be considered.  
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Accordingly, since no common law rule can free the authorities from respecting 
parents' human rights it is impossible to insulate them from the alleged chilling effects 
of parental litigation. It seems to follow that the behaviour of child care professionals 
is unlikely to be influenced one way or the other were the common law also to 
recognise a duty to parents. As the Court of Appeal in East Berkshire noted when 
justifying its unchallenged finding of a duty in favour of children, the risk that 
potential liability might inhibit such professionals from taking what they believe to be 
the right course of action will ‘henceforth be present, whether the anticipated 
litigation is founded on the Human Rights Act or on the common law duty of care’ (at 
[82]). Though the Court of Appeal did not say so, its conclusion is indirectly 
supported by the findings of the numerous inquiries which show that the common 
causes of child protection failures are over-stretched resources, poor information-
sharing, and inadequate training, supervision and co-ordination, rather than litigation-
induced staff timidity (see Every child matters, Cm 5860, 2003).  
 
The House of Lords ‘no duty’ analysis is not the only (much less the best) way to 
protect children’s safety or avoid placing the authorities in a quandary.  The claimed 
'conflict', so influential in East Berkshire, could have been accommodated by drawing 
a distinction between decisions to provide immediate protection to children believed 
to be at risk and the conduct of subsequent (and less urgent) procedures. At the earlier 
stage, the authorities should be entitled to act on the precautionary principle and to err 
on the side of caution in cases of doubt. By sanctioning a ‘safe rather than sorry’ 
strategy, the courts could thereby treat them as having simultaneously discharged their 
initial (low-level) duty to the parent. Accordingly, early intervention may be justified 
whenever there appears to be an immediate and sufficiently serious risk, even if the 
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supporting evidence is presently less than certain. At this point, the standard of care 
may amount to little more than requiring that decisions are taken in good faith. 
Employing Bolam in this way would not only maintain a strong breach barrier against 
weak (parental) claims but would minimise the asserted (but untested) danger that 
inadequate protection will otherwise be provided to children. TP and KM v UK shows 
that the ECtHR is prepared to concede considerable discretion to domestic authorities 
where tricky decisions are taken in what appears to be an emergency, while Yousef v 
Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210 emphasises that children's interests must prevail over 
parents' in the event of conflict. Had a similar approach been adopted in the 
negligence claims under review the doctors and social workers would not have been 
caught up in the impossible ‘Catch 22’ fearfully envisaged by the majority of their 
Lordships. 
 
Conclusions 
The reluctance to allow overly enthusiastic (albeit well-meaning) interventions to be 
challenged by falsely suspected parents, while disappointing, may not be too 
surprising in light of the mournful history of timid and dilatory official responses to 
the troubling problem of child abuse, and the deference traditionally shown by courts 
to medical decision-making. The significance of the East Berkshire decision will 
depend on whether it signals a general willingness to return to ‘no duty’ strike-outs. If  
not, its net effect will be very limited, having barred only those parental claims arising 
before the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000, thereby 
forcing these appellants (but not their wronged children) to travel to Strasbourg for a 
remedy. Rather than leaving matters to be ‘swept up by the Convention’, as Lord 
Bingham put it (at [50]), it would have been preferable to have relied on s. 6 to justify 
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developing domestic negligence law compatibly with European human rights 
jurisprudence. 
 
 Kevin Williams, 
Sheffield Hallam University 
  
